Brazilian military officers convicted of more than two years in prison by the Federal Supreme Court (STF) for their role in the attempted coup continue to receive full military salaries, pensions, or retirement benefits.
According to Brazil’s Transparency Portal, the federal government spends at least R$ 4.58 million per year (about US$900,000) to pay 13 service members involved in the coup plot. Monthly salaries range from R$ 12,307 (approx. US$2,266) paid to former president and retired Army captain Jair Bolsonaro to R$ 36,502 (approx US$6,719) paid to retired Army General Augusto Heleno. Calculations include a 13th-month salary but exclude additional benefits.
This group includes eight “kids pretos”, a special-operations designation for elite active-duty and reserve Army personnel, accused of plotting the assassination of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. It also includes five senior officers from the so-called “Hard Core” of the conspiracy: Jair Bolsonaro, retired Navy Admiral Almir Garnier, and retired Army Generals Paulo Sérgio Nogueira, Augusto Heleno, and Walter Braga Netto.
‘Legal death’ loophole
Experts interviewed by BdF say these payments will only stop once the officers are tried by Brazil’s Superior Military Court (STM), which could then strip them of their ranks.
Before that can happen, each case must be reviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor General for Military Justice (PGJM), which will submit recommendations to the STM’s Justification and Review Council, a body composed of 15 judges, including 10 military officers and 5 civilian magistrates.
“They should have already submitted these cases, they’ve had more than enough time,” said political scientist and attorney Jorge Folena. “From what I hear, they will likely wait until February next year.” The STM and PGJM did not respond to BdF’s inquiries about the timeline.
Even if the officers lose their ranks, their families may continue to receive their salaries due to a provision known as “morte ficta”, “legal death”, contained in the Army statute. “In this scenario, family members continue to receive the soldier’s pay. I consider it absurd, a privilege granted to the military that they should not have,” Folena argued.
He says the mechanism should already have been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. “This clashes directly with the republican principle that all citizens must be equal under the law and that public service must operate with full transparency.”
‘Authoritarian leftovers’
Historian Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva argues that the convictions and arrests of the coup-plotting officers before Brazil’s Supreme Court (STF) “have not closed the cycle.” He says a significant amount of what he calls “authoritarian leftovers”, privileges inherited from the military dictatorship (1964–1985), continues to shield the Armed Forces from accountability under civilian law. As an example, he points to recent public reactions by military leaders who opposed the convictions.
On 26 November 2025, the presidents of Brazil’s three main military clubs, Admiral Alexandre José Barreto de Mattos (Navy Club), Brigadier General Sérgio Tavares Carneiro (Army Club), and Air Force Major-Brigadier Marco Antonio Carballo Perez (Aerospace Club), issued a joint statement expressing “grave concern” over the imprisonment of officers involved in the attempted coup.
The letter, titled “Unjust Imprisonments,” echoes sentiments held by a substantial segment of the Brazilian Armed Forces, criticizing what they claim was a flawed judicial process. The statement argues that the immediate arrests, carried out even amid “consistent technical criticisms” of the legal proceedings, create the perception that “essential stages of review and deliberation were disregarded.”
They denounce the penalties as “disproportionate and unbalanced, punishments that should not even exist,” comparing them to sentences typically handed down to violent criminals such as murderers and drug traffickers.
Defending the reputation of the convicted officers, the club presidents wrote that the arrests target “respected military leaders with unblemished careers spanning more than 40 years in service to the nation.” Disagreeing with the Supreme Court, they argue, should not be seen as an attack on democratic institutions but “a defense of legal certainty and the credibility of the judiciary.”
The letter concludes that challenging the convictions is “not only legitimate but necessary” to ensure a “solid, respectful and truly republican” justice system, one that welcomes well-founded criticism rather than advancing despite it.
Teixeira da Silva also noted a recent episode in which a judge from the Superior Military Court (STM), Minister Carlos Augusto Amaral Oliveira, publicly rebuked the court’s president, Minister Maria Elizabeth Guimarães Teixeira Rocha, after she apologized to victims of the military dictatorship, a sign, he says, of how deeply these authoritarian structures remain entrenched.
Teixeira da Silva says the backlash reflects “a deep, teeth-grinding resistance,” so strong that military leaders felt compelled to formalize it in a public letter. He stresses that the Armed Forces still benefit from privileges and “private laws” that apply only to them, effectively placing military personnel above the rest of Brazil’s citizenship.
Among those privileges, lawyer Jorge Folena also criticizes a recent decision by Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes permitting the convicted officers to serve their sentences in military detention facilities rather than the civilian prison system.
“If they are convicted, Bolsonaro included, they should go to the regular prison system, like any other citizen under the Constitution,” Folena argued.
Even so, he expects the loss of military rank to be imposed soon. “The president of the Superior Military Court has signaled to Brazilian society that a judgment will take place and that she will work to ensure it is fair and in accordance with the Constitution and the Military Code.”
History of rank removal
There is strong legal precedent for stripping military officers of their ranks once convicted. Over the past eight years, Brazil’s Superior Military Court (STM) has concluded 96 disciplinary cases evaluating whether officers found guilty of crimes remain fit for service. In more than 86% of those rulings (84 cases), the court decided to remove the officer’s rank and status. So far in 2025 alone, 17 cases have been finalized.
Folena argues that deeper structural reforms are needed, including changes to Article 142 of Brazil’s Constitution, which defines the role of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force). The article allows the military to be deployed domestically under the “Guaranteeing Law and Order” framework, known as GLO, a provision repeatedly cited by Bolsonaristas while calling for military intervention against democratic institutions.
“GLO is a republican error, a monarchical mechanism,” the lawyer said, noting that it was first introduced in Brazil’s 1824 Imperial Constitution under Emperor Pedro I. “It should not exist in a democratic system.”
Manuel Domingos Neto, a historian and retired professor at the Federal Fluminense University who has studied the Brazilian military for over 50 years, says that while the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva recently approved key national defense documents, including the National Defense Policy, the National Defense Strategy, and the White Book on Defense, they were not widely debated in Congress or society.
“These documents were essentially produced by the Armed Forces themselves,” Neto noted. “There was only a formal, superficial participation from Congress. No one knows about these texts, the political parties were not involved. Only a firm political decision can truly place the Armed Forces under democratic control.”
