Vazamento

Wikileaks: Michel Temer era informante da embaixada americana

A organização fez postagem no twitter onde acusa o presidente interino de ser "o lider do golpe parlamentar"

OCafézinho

,
Brasília - O presidente interino Michel Temer durante cerimônia de posse aos ministros de seu governo, no Palácio do Planalto / Valter Campanato/Agência Brasill

Não venham me dizer que estou inventando coisas!

Sei que parece teoria da conspiração, papo de esquerdista maluco, mas não posso fazer nada.

Não fui eu que disse.  Foi o Wikileaks. Hoje.

A organização divulgou, em seu twitter, nesta noite de quinta-feira, um micropost em que acusa o "presidente interino" Michel Temer de ser informante do governo americano.

Observe que o Wikileaks chama o impeachment de Dilma Rousseff pelo que ele é: um golpe parlamentar.


Brasil's #Dilma ousted in parliamentary coup; new pres is US embassy informant Michel Temer https://t.co/gpXqw7txF3 https://t.co/8ehpIYMC7K


— WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) 12 de maio de 2016

 

Os bilhetes diplomáticos não mostram, a meu ver, nada explosivo. Seria exagerado chamar Michel Temer de "informante da CIA", por exemplo. Ele não valia tanto para a CIA.

O Wikileaks o chama apenas de "informante da embaixada americana". O que é a mesma coisa de ser chamado de "informante do governo americano", visto que as informações que ele fornece são remetidas imediatamente para órgãos estratégicos do governo dos Estados Unidos.

Os bilhetes não são classificados, ou seja, não são secretos, mas contém informações que devem ser usadas apenas entre as autoridades do governo americano.

Temer subsidia o Cônsul Geral de São Paulo com informações, de fato, sensíveis, sobretudo partindo de um aliado político do governo brasileiro. Ele faz, por exemplo, críticas pesadas ao governo Lula, dizendo que ele investia muito em programas sociais… E menciona a possibilidade do PMDB construir uma candidatura própria.

O atual presidente interino, já então presidente do PMDB, diz outra coisa perigosa a se dizer a um membro do ultra-conservador serviço de inteligência do governo americano, como são quase todos os cônsules, em especial os de São Paulo e Rio: Temer afirma que Lula daria uma  forte guinada à esquerda em seu segundo governo. Um aliado do governo afirmar isso a um agente da inteligência norte-americana é uma irresponsabilidade!

Coisa de traíra mesmo.

Temer estava entregando estratégias políticas internas ultrasensíveis, em vocabulário alarmante, a uma autoridade do serviço de inteligência de uma potência altamente agressiva e bélica como os Estados Unidos!

Outra parte que revela o caráter traiçoeiro de Temer é quando aborda os esquemas de corrupção do PT e não lembra ao cônsul que o seu próprio partido é o mais corrupto de todos. Manchar a imagem do partido aliado, numa reunião secreta com o embaixador americano, não me parece uma postura leal e digna.

Os bilhetes do Wikileaks não provam que Michel Temer estivesse na folha de pagamento da CIA, mas revelam um traidor contumaz, um traidor de seus aliados no Brasil e, portanto, um traidor também dos interesses nacionais.

Há um capítulo, inclusive, que o funcionário do serviço secreto americano, que resenha o bilhete, dá um título irônico às falas de Michel Temer: "With Allies Like This . . . "

Que significa: "Com um aliado como esse…"

Os mexicanos diriam, ironicamente: muy amigo!

O funcionário, naturalmente, ficou chocado com a falta de cuidado de Michel Temer, em revelar tão abertamente, tão loquazmente, a um representante de governo estrangeiro, a discórdia surda, crescente, entre PT e PMDB.

A NSA, pelo jeito, não tem muito o que fazer por aqui: os nossos políticos vazam, voluntariamente, informações sensíveis ao governo americano. Se vazam de graça, não posso dizer.

Links dos dois bilhetes vazados:

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06SAOPAULO689_a.html

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06SAOPAULO30_a.html

**



Telegrama 1

PMDB CHIEF AFFIRMS PARTY'S POSITION AS POWER BROKER BUT BALKS AT PREDICTING PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Date: 2006 June 21, 16:05 (Wednesday)

Original Classification:

UNCLASSIFIED,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Locator:

TEXT ONLINE

TAGS: BR - Brazil | ECON - Economic Affairs–Economic Conditions, Trends and Potential | PGOV - Political Affairs–Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PINR - Political Affairs–Intelligence

Concepts: – Not Assigned –

From: Brazil São Paulo

To: Argentina Buenos Aires | Bolivia La Paz | Brazil Brasilia | Brazil Recife | Brazil Rio De Janeiro | Chile Santiago | Department of Commerce | Department of Labor | Department of the Treasury | National Security Council | Paraguay Asunción | Secretary of State | United States Southern Command (Miami) | Uruguay Montevideo

Show Headers

(C) SAO PAULO 623; (D) BRASILIA 1136;

(E) SAO PAULO 573 AND PREVIOUS; (F) SAO PAULO 30

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

——-

SUMMARY

——-

1. (SBU) Michel Temer, President of the Brazilian Democratic

Movement Party (PMDB), believes President Lula has done a masterful

job of disassociating himself from the political corruption scandals

that have crushed some of his closest advisers. He also has

effectively expanded social programs to earn the loyalty and support

of Brazil's lower-middle and lower classes. At the same time,

Lula's opponent, Sao Paulo ex-Governor Geraldo Alckmin, suffers from

a lack of charisma and a failure to have left a visible mark in five

years at the helm of Brazil's largest state. Nevertheless, Temer

declines to predict what will happen in this race, except to say it

will go to a second round, in which "anything can happen." He

confirmed that his own party will not run a candidate for president

and will not ally with either Lula's Workers Party (PT) or the

opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), at least not

before the second round. However, the PMDB will win the governors'

races in at least ten and possibly as many as fifteen states, and

will again have the largest bloc in both the Senate and the Chamber

of Deputies, so that "whoever wins the presidential election will

have to come to us to get anything done." END SUMMARY.

———————-

LULA'S SLEIGHT OF HAND

———————-

2. (SBU) In a June 19 meeting with Consul General (CG) and Poloff,

Michel Temer, Federal Deputy from Sao Paulo, offered his assessment

of the balance of forces for the presidential election. Though

anything can still happen – he has seen candidates overcome much

greater disadvantages than Alckmin currently faces, and win – it is

clear that President Lula is in a strong position. Temer

dispassionately analyzed how Lula had seen his Chief of Staff and

the entire leadership of his party disgraced, and prominent

Congressional members of his party dragged through scandal, and had

emerged personally more or less untouched. This was partly because

other political parties – Temer mentioned the PSDB and the Liberal

Front Party (PFL) but not his own PMDB, though his comment could

just as easily apply to them – had, at different times, been

involved in affairs akin to the PT's infamous "mensalao" bribery

scheme, and were thus not eager to expose the PT's misdeeds to the

fullest.

3. (U) It was also because Lula had such a strong bond with the

people, the so-called C, D, and E classes - i.e., the lower-middle

and lower classes. Many in these strata, in Temer's view, believe

that Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) had robbed the poor and given

to the rich, while Lula robs the rich and gives to the poor. Lula

has expanded the "Bolsa Familia" program from 6.5 million families

in 2004 to 8.7 million in 2005 to 11 million families this year, or

(assuming two children per family) roughly 44 million Brazilians.

This, combined with the increase in the minimum wage, the rise of

the Real against the US dollar, and the fall in the price of certain

basic food staples, make the poor much better off. Paradoxically,

many of the rich, especially bankers and other major financial

players, have also benefited from Lula's policies.

4. (SBU) It is the middle class that has suffered from both an

increasing tax burden and the loss of professional-level jobs. In

SAO PAULO 00000689 002 OF 004

truth, Temer continued, it is difficult to be optimistic about

Brazil's economic future. The fact of 11 million families eligible

for Bolsa Familia handouts implies a minimum of 44 million people in

abject misery in Brazil. He described a recent event he had

attended sponsored by the Institute for Industrial Development

Studies (IEDI), where Minister of Development, Commerce, and

Industry Luiz Fernando Furlan delivered an upbeat speech. When

challenged by a member of the audience with a few hard questions and

statistics, Furlan, who has himself been at times a tough critic of

the GoB's economic policies, was at pains to respond. Brazil faces

serious challenges in fostering growth, stimulating productivity,

attracting investment, improving infrastructure, and reducing

inequality; however, Lula's sleight of hand has made many voters all

but unaware of these growing problems.

————————–

ALCKMIN'S LACK OF CHARISMA

————————–

5. (SBU) Meanwhile, Alckmin is simply stuck. Temer believes that

since inheriting the governorship from Mario Covas in 2001, Alckmin

has provided honest, decent, competent government to Sao Paulo.

However, in a country that relishes superlatives, he did not

champion any great works, and his accomplishments are not visible.

Alckmin is not personally aggressive or charismatic and is not given

to showmanship, so he didn't leave a distinctive mark on the state.

By way of comparison, Orestes Quercia (ref C), Governor of Sao Paulo

from 1987 to 1990, was a controversial (many say corrupt) figure,

but he definitely left his mark on the state in the many streets and

highways and prisons and hospitals he built. (COMMENT: The same

might be said of colorful, and reportedly equally corrupt, former

Mayor and Governor Paulo Maluf. END COMMENT.) Former President

Cardoso was another example of a politician who had charisma. But

let's wait and see what happens, Temer suggested. Wait until after

the World Cup, which could impact on the voters in a variety of

different and not easily predictable ways, depending on the result.

Wait until the government-subsidized television advertising begins.

It will be "a great war" on the airwaves, and it opens up

innumerable possibilities for the underdog.

6. (U) Temer, a former Sao Paulo state Secretary for Public

Security, was not certain whether Alckmin would suffer as a result

of the recent violence on the streets and in the prisons of Sao

Paulo (ref E) perpetrated by the criminal gang First Capital Command

(PCC). Some of his public criticism of his successor, Governor

Claudio Lembo, had been unfortunate and not good for his image. But

only time will tell how this situation plays out.

————————

LULA'S TURN TO THE LEFT?

————————

7. (SBU) CG asked what a second Lula term would look like, assuming

he is re-elected. Unlike some of our interlocutors, Temer believes

Lula may take a more radical (i.e., populist) approach during a

second term. The recent incident in which radicals from the

Movement for the Liberation of the Landless (MLST) stormed the

Chamber of Deputies (ref D) and committed acts of vandalism was a

harbinger of things to come. The group's leader, a member of the

PT's Executive Committee, had on many occasions over the years been

seen at Lula's side. The PT had suspended him, but had taken no

further action and did not appear particularly upset over the

episode, Temer noted.

8. (SBU) Lula, in Temer's view, was a trade unionist who had done

well for himself, who, once re-elected, might finally begin to heed

his friends on the left. Very possibly he would let himself be led

SAO PAULO 00000689 003 OF 004

away from the orthodox macro-economic policies that have dominated

his first term. (COMMENT: Some other observers have also pointed to

the GOB's expansion of social spending in recent months as an

indication that Lula is drifting left. Thus far, however, this

spending seems in line with the pump-priming measures of most

incumbents seeking re-election. While Temer sees Lula's campaign

pitting "rich versus poor" as a sign of things to come in a second

term, many analysts who have followed Lula's career characterize him

as a "cultural conservative" who is unlikely to succumb to the

radical leftist/populist temptation. A more worrisome, and more

likely, scenario is a second-term Lula government that lacks the

policy direction, political will, and working majority in Congress

required to push through essential economic and political reforms.

END COMMENT.)

——————————

PMDB - A HOUSE (STILL) DIVIDED

——————————

9. (SBU) Turning to his own party's fortunes, Temer confirmed

reports that the PMDB will not run its own candidate for President,

and will not enter into a formal alliance with either the PSDB or

the PT. Any of these options at the national level, he explained,

would damage the party's chances in some of the states because the

"verticalization" rule remains in effect during the 2006 elections.

The recent ruling by the Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE), which

would have tightened even further the rules governing party

alliances (ref B), was probably correct, Temer averred, even though

it would have been disastrous for the PMDB. If you're going to

require parties to replicate their national alliances at the state

level, it makes perfect sense to go a step further and say that

parties that don't run or formally support presidential candidates

may not ally at the state level with parties that do. Nevertheless,

as the head of a party whose lifeblood is coalition-building at the

state level, Temer was relieved when the TSE reversed itself within

48 hours, and he looked forward to the 2010 elections when the

Constitutional amendment abolishing the "verticalization" rule

altogether would enter into force.

10. (SBU) If the presidential election goes into a second round, as

Temer is sure it will, the PMDB may at that point throw its support

to one side or the other. The PMDB remains split almost evenly

between the pro- and anti-Lula groups. The former seeks alliances

with the PT and hopes for several Ministries in Lula's second

administration. Temer, who is anti-Lula, was highly critical of the

pro-Lula faction and commented wryly over some of the party's

internal contradictions and divisions. Renan Calheiros, President

of the Senate, is the leader of the PMDB's pro-Lula faction; yet, in

his home state of Alagoas (northeast), the PMDB will support the

PSDB's gubernatorial candidate, Senator Teotonio Vilela. Another

pro-Lula leader is Senator (and former President) Jose Sarney, but

his daughter, PFL Senator Roseana Sarney, will be running for

Governor of Maranhao (also in the northeast) with PMDB support

against a PT candidate. Temer outlined the situation state by

state, ending with Sao Paulo. The PSDB, he noted, badly wants an

alliance with the PMDB, but they want to choose the PMDB candidate

to be Jose Serra's running mate. This issue will be resolved within

the week, since the PMDB holds its state convention on June 24. The

party will not hold a national convention June 29 as originally

planned, since all its issues at the national level were resolved at

a preliminary June 11 caucus.

11. (SBU) Temer, who himself had strongly favored fielding a PMDB

presidential candidate (ref F), noted that by relinquishing this

ambition, the PMDB stands to win the governors' races in ten or

perhaps even fifteen states, and will again have the largest blocs

in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, whichever

SAO PAULO 00000689 004 OF 004

party wins the Presidency will inevitably have to seek an alliance

with the PMDB in order to govern. Temer spoke caustically of the

Lula administration's miserly rewards for its allies in the PMDB.

They give the job of Minister to a PMDB loyalist, but no real

control over the Ministry; thus, he can't accomplish anything. In

contrast, Temer believes that in return for joining a governing

alliance, the party should be given control over a sector of the

economy, agriculture, say, or health, and full responsibility for

operating that sector, and should receive full credit or blame for

the successes and failures in that sector. (COMMENT: Left unsaid,

of course, is that the sort of control Temer envisions would also

give the PMDB, and other allied parties, the opportunity to advance

their political patronage goals at the taxpayers' expense. The

PMDB, which is Brazil's largest political party, is already

well-known as a vehicle for patronage. END COMMENT.)

——-

COMMENT

——-

12. (SBU) Temer was more charitable in his assessment of Alckmin's

campaign and his performance as Governor than Alckmin's own PSDB

colleague, Andrea Matarazzo (ref A). Nevertheless, Temer's critique

hits home: Alckmin may perform in the coming months, but so far he

simply has not connected at any level with the electorate. Lula's

job performance, on the other hand, may be open to question, but his

ability to communicate with and relate to the average Brazilian is

unsurpassed. Temer is correct that whichever candidate wins will

need to turn to the PMDB for support in governing. The real problem

is that the PMDB has no ideology or policy framework that it could

bring to the task of formulating and implementing a coherent

national political agenda. Despite the party's illustrious history

as the guiding force that led Brazil from military dictatorship to

democracy, the PMDB, which now holds the balance of political power,

has devolved into a loose coalition of opportunistic regional

"caciques" who for the most part - and there are exceptions - seek

political power for its own sake. Such a party is hardly suited to

the task of providing political direction, which would be

particularly important in a post-election alliance with Lula's

rudderless PT. END COMMENT.

13. (U) This cable was coordinated/cleared with Embassy Brasilia.

MCMULLEN

**

Telegrama 2

PMDB LEADER PONDERS PARTY'S ELECTORAL OPTIONS

Date: 2006 January 11, 14:02 (Wednesday)

Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TAGS: BR - Brazil | ETRD - Economic Affairs–Foreign Trade | PGOV - Political Affairs–Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PINR - Political Affairs–Intelligence

From: Brazil São Paulo

To: Argentina Buenos Aires | Bolivia La Paz | Brazil Brasilia | Brazil Recife | Brazil Rio De Janeiro | Chile Santiago | National Security Council | Paraguay Asunción | Secretary of State | United States Southern Command (Miami) | Uruguay Montevideo

Content

1. (U) Sensitive but Unclassified - protect accordingly.

2. (SBU) Summary: Federal Deputy Michel Temer, national

president of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB),

believes that public disillusion with President Lula and the

Workers' Party (PT) provides an opportunity for the PMDB to

field its own candidate in the 2006 presidential election.

However, party divisions and the lack of a compelling choice

as a candidate could force the PMDB into an alliance with

Lula's PT or the opposition PSDB. If Lula's polling numbers

do not improve before the PMDB primaries in March, Temer

said his party might nominate its own candidate. This would

still allow the party to forge an alliance with the PT or

PSDB in a runoff, assuming that the PMDB candidate fails to

make the second round. Given its centrist orientation, the

PMDB may hold the balance of votes between the two opposing

forces. It is also likely to remain a force at the local

and state level. Temer believes it has a chance to win as

many as 14 gubernatorial races. End Summary.

—————————

With Allies Like This . . .

—————————

3. (SBU) Michel Temer, a Federal deputy from Sao Paulo who

served as president of the Chamber of Deputies from 1997

through 2000, met January 9 with CG and poloffs to discuss

the current political situation. Lula's election, he said,

had raised great hope among the Brazilian people, but his

performance in office has been disappointing. Temer

criticized Lula's narrow vision and his excessive focus on

social safety net programs that don't promote growth or

economic development. The PT had campaigned on one program

and, once in office, had done the opposite of what it

promised, which Temer characterized as electoral fraud.

Worse, some PT leaders had stolen state money, not for

personal gain, but to expand the party's power, and had thus

fomented a great deal of popular disillusion.

————————-

PMDB Perceives an Opening

————————-

4. (SBU) This reality, Temer continued, opens an

opportunity for the PMDB. The party currently holds nine

statehouses and has the second-highest number of federal

deputies (after the PT), along with a great many mayoralties

and city council and state legislative seats. Polls show

that voters are tired of both the PT and the main opposition

party, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). For

example, a recent poll showed former governor (and PMDB

state chairman) Orestes Quercia leading in the race for Sao

Paulo state governor.

———————–

Divisions Dog the Party

———————–

5. (SBU) Asked why the PMDB remains so divided, Temer said

the reasons were both historical and related to the nature

of Brazilian political parties. The PMDB grew out of the

Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) under the military

dictatorship, which operated as an umbrella group for

legitimate opposition to the military dictatorship. After

the restoration of democracy, some members left the PMDB to

form new parties (such as the PT and PSDB), but many of

those who remained now act as power brokers at the local and

regional level. Thus the PMDB has no real unifying national

identity but rather an umbrella organization for regional

"caciques" or bosses. Temer noted that the PMDB is not the

only divided party. Although there are 28 political parties

in Brazil, most of them do not represent an ideology or a

particular line of political thinking that would support a

national vision.

—————————-

SAO PAULO 00000030 002 OF 003

PMDB Primaries Set for March

—————————-

6. (SBU) Temer confirmed press reports that he is seeking

to move the March 5 primary date to a date later in the

month. (Note: March 31 is the deadline for executives and

Ministers to resign their offices if they plan to run for

public office. End Note.) There will be some 20,000

electors, he said, including all PMDB members who hold

electoral office (federal and state deputies, governors,

mayors, vice-governors and -mayors, and other elected

municipal officials) as well as delegates chosen at state

conventions.

—————————————

Lula's Numbers Will Drive PMDB Strategy

—————————————

7. (SBU) If, between now and the primary, the Lula

government's standing in the polls improves, it is still

possible the PMDB will seek an electoral alliance with Lula

and the PT, Temer said. If not, the PMDB will run its own

candidate. So far, Rio de Janeiro ex-governor Anthony

Garotinho has been working the hardest, reaching out to the

whole country in search of support. But there is resistance

to him from within the PMDB, in part due to his populist

image, in part because there appears to be a ceiling to his

support. Germano Rigotto, governor of Rio Grande do Sul

(reftels) is a possible candidate, though he is still not

well known outside the south. Nelson Jobim, a judge on the

Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) who has announced his

intention to step down, is another possibility; however, he

can't campaign until he leaves the Tribunal, and he may not

have time to attract the support necessary to win the

primary.

——————————————–

PMDB's Fallback - PT or PSDB in Second Round

——————————————–

8. (SBU) Temer was confident that despite its current

division, the PMDB will unite for the election, whether in

support of its own candidate or in alliance with another

party. If it runs a candidate who fails to make it to the

second round, the party will seek to negotiate an alliance

with one of the two finalists. He noted that the PMDB had

supported the government of PSDB former president Fernando

Henrique Cardoso, and said there should be a "re-fusion" of

the two parties into a permanent grand alliance. The PMDB

would have no problem with either Sao Paulo Mayor Jose Serra

or Sao Paulo state governor Geraldo Alckmin, who are

competing for the PSDB nomination. In 2002, the PMDB

supported Serra against Lula.

9. (SBU) Asked about the party's program, Temer indicated

that the PMDB favors policies to support economic growth.

It has no objection to the Free Trade Area of the Americas

(FTAA). It would prefer to see Mercosul strengthened so as

to negotiate FTAA as a bloc, but the trend appears to be

moving the other way.

——————————

Comment: PMDB As Power Broker?

——————————

10. (SBU) For now, the PMDB is keeping its options open.

Though Temer didn't mention it, the party's leadership is

waiting to see whether the "verticalizacao" rule will remain

in force for the 2006 elections. This rule, decreed by a

2002 decision of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE),

dictates that electoral alliances at the national level must

be replicated in races for governors and federal deputies.

The Senate passed a measure repealing the rule, and the

lower chamber is expected to vote on it shortly, with

prospects uncertain. There is also a legal challenge to the

rule pending which the TSE will likely take up in February.

The PMDB wants to know the rules of the game before deciding

on possible alliances, since most observers believe that a

SAO PAULO 00000030 003 OF 003

PMDB presidential candidate would not fare well under the

current system of "verticalizacao." Temer appeared open to

the possibility of an alliance with either the PT or the

PSDB, or to a stand-alone PMDB candidate. Given its

centrist orientation, the PMDB may hold the balance of votes

between Lula's PT and the opposition PSDB, and thus bears

watching closely in the months ahead. End Comment.

11. (U) Biographic Note: Michel Miguel Elias Temer Lulia

has served as federal deputy from Sao Paulo since 1987,

except for a two-year period (1993-94) when he was Secretary

for Public Security in the Sao Paulo state government. He

studied at the University of Sao Paulo and earned a

Doctorate in Law from the Catholic University of Sao Paulo.

From 1984 through 1986 he was the state's Prosecutor

General. He served as the PMDB's leader in the Camara de

Deputados 1995-97 and as President of the Camara 1997-2000.

He was national president of the PMDB 2001-03 and 2004-

present.

12. (U) This cable was cleared/coordinated with Embassy

Brasilia.

McMullen